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Abstract
This note shows that capacities satisfying the axioms consquentialism, state independence and
conditional certainty equivalent consistency under updating are a generalised version of neo-
additive capacities as axiomatised in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007).
1
1 Introduction
A major challenge for modelling ambiguity of a decision maker in a dynamic context lies in the
well-known precarious relationship between updating capacities or multiple priors, dynamic
consistency and consequentialism. Early work by Epstein and LeBreton (1993) and Eichberger
and Kelsey (1996) showed that updating Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) preferences, which
satisfy consequentialism, in a dynamically consistent way implied additive beliefs. Even if
dynamic consistency was constrained to an event tree, ambiguous beliefs modelled by a capacity
were possible only on the final partition of events (see for example, Sarin and Wakker (1998)
and Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2005a)). For ambiguity beliefs modelled with multiple
priors, Epstein and Schneider (2003) found that the set of priors had to fulfill a fairly restrictive
rectangularity condition in order to guarantee dynamically consistent preferences. In particular,
the original Ellsberg paradox cannot be explained with rectangular sets of priors.
In the light of these results, there are essentially two ways to proceed. Either we can abandon
consequentialism, and all the models that rely on it such as CEU and multiple priors, or we
can relax dynamic consistency. The former route has been explored by Hanany and Kilbanoff
(2004).
In the spirit of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), we consider a preference relation and the family
of its updated preferences which satisfy the three axioms Consequentialism, State Indepen-
dence, and Conditional Certainty Equivalent Consistency. For the case where the beliefs can be
described by multiple priors, as in the approach of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Pires (2002)
proved that these three axioms are equivalent to the Full Bayesian Updating of all prior prob-
abilities. For the case where the preference relation can be represented by a Choquet integral
and beliefs by a capacity, as in Schmeidler (1989), Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2005b) and
Horie (2007) established that Consequentialism, State Independence, and Conditional Certainty
Equivalent Consistency for Binary Gambles, are equivalent to Full Bayesian Updating of the
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capacity as suggested by Jaffray (1992) and Walley (1991).1
In this note, we characterize the family of capacities for which the three initial axioms of Pires
(2002) hold, that is, where Conditional Certainty Equivalent Consistency is not restricted to
binary acts. Interestingly, it turns out to be a class of capacities which is slightly more general
than neo-additive capacities which were axiomatized in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant
(2007). For neo-additive capacities the Choquet expected utility preferences can be calculated
as a convex combination of expected utility with respect to an additive probability distribution
and the Hurwicz criterion (Hurwicz (1951)) which itself is a convex combination of the utility
values of the best and the worst outcomes.
The Choquet integral with respect to a generalized neo-additive capacity is a linear combination
of the expected utility and the Hurwicz criterion, but the combination need not be convex.
Moreover, we can show that convex generalized neo-additive capacities are the only capacities
for which the core of the Full Bayesian update of a capacity coincides with the set of Bayesian
updates of the probabilities in the core of the original capacity. These results provides a further
justification for neo-additive capacities as a useful restriction on the Choquet expected utility
approach.
2 The model
Let Ω be a finite set of states of the world, Σ = 2Ω, the set of events in Ω. For E ∈ Σ, Ec
denotes the complement of E. Let X be a set of outcomes. An act is a function f : Ω → X,
and F denotes the set of such acts. A capacity v is a set function from Σ to R with v(∅) = 0,
v(Ω) = 1 and v(A) ≤ v(B) for all A ⊂ B, A and B in Σ.
In the main part of the paper, we will restrict attention to capacities for which the only null set
is the empty set, i.e., v(E) = 0⇔ E = ∅, and the only universal set is Ω, v(E) = 1⇔ E = Ω.
The general case is treated in Appendix B.
Given a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u : X → R, the Choquet Expected Utility
1 Horie (2007) showed that the necessary conditions in Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2005b) were too stong and
suggested an appropriate weakening of the Conditional Certainty Equivalence Consistency Axiom.
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(CEU) of an act f with respect to the capacity ν is given by CEU(f, ν) = ∫ 0
−∞
(v(u (f(ω)) ≥
t) − 1)dt +
∫ +∞
0
v(u (f(ω)) ≥ t)dt. Since acts are finite-valued they can be written as f =
n∑
i=1
xiAi, where Ai is the indicator function of the set Ai. Without loss of generality, suppose that
the finite outcomes xi ∈ f(Ω) are ordered such that u(xi) < u(xi+1),[Simon asks (16/12)
shouldn’t “<” be “≤”] then
CEU(f, ν) =
n∑
i=1
u(xi) · [v(Ai ∪ Ai+1 ∪ ... ∪ An)− v(Ai+1 ∪ Ai+2 ∪ ... ∪ An)]
=
n∑
i=1
u(xi) ·m(Ai),
with m(Ai) := [v(Ai ∪Ai+1..An)− v(Ai+1 ∪Ai+2..An)] .
Throughout this paper, we will consider preference relations  on F which can be represented
by a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) functional,
f  g if and only if CEU(f, ν) ≥ CEU(g, ν).
2.1 Updating preferences
Consider a family of preference relations E on F which represent the decision maker’s pref-
erences after it becomes known that the event E has occurred. The ex-ante unconditional pref-
erence relation on F will be denoted by  .
For preferences which are additive, that is, represented by a CEU functional with an additive
capacity ν, standard Bayesian updating satisfies the following two axioms.
Axiom C Consequentialism
For any two acts f , g ∈ F ,
if f = g on E, then f ∼E g.
Consequentialism rules out effects on future choices from outcomes which would have become
relevant in the event Ec which did not happen.
In contrast, the second axiom , dynamic consistency, requires that preferences after E occurred
remain consistent with ex-ante preferences.
Axiom DC Dynamic Consistency
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For any acts f , g ∈ F and any event E ∈ Σ,
f ≻E g if and only if fEg ≻ g.
It is well known (Ghirardato (2002)), that the two axioms, consequentialism and dynamic con-
sistency, imply a capacity ν for a CEU decision maker which is additive and updated by Bayes
rule . Hence, any updating rule which leaves room for uncertainty represented by a non-additive
capacity must relax either consequentialism or dynamic consistency.
Retaining consequentialism Pires (2002) proposes a weaker version of DC, conditional cer-
tainty equivalent consistency which restricts the act g of the classical DC axiom to be constant.
Axiom CCEC (Conditional Certainty Equivalent Consistency)
For any event E = ∅, any outcome x ∈ X, and any act f in F ,
f ∼E x if and only if fEx ∼ x.
For multiple-prior preferences, Pires (2002) proved that consequentialism and conditional cer-
tainty equivalent consistency imply the Full Bayesian updating rule, where each probability
distribution in the set of priors is updated according to Bayes rule. .
3 Generalized neo-additive capacities
In this section we introduce a slightly generalized concept of a neo-additive capacity, which we
call Generalized Neo-additive Capacity (GNAC). CEU preferences with a neo-additive capacity,
as axiomatized in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007), are a special case of a GNAC. As
a first building block we introduce a capacity which we call Hurwicz capacity, because it was
implicit in the decision rule suggested by Hurwicz (1951).
Definition 3.1 A Hurwicz capacity µα with degree of optimism α is defined by µα(∅) = 0,
µα(Ω) = 1, and µα(E) = α for all other events E ∈ Σ.
[Simon asks (16/12) for µα to be a capacity, don’t we require α ∈ 0, 1?]
A generalized neo-additive capacity (GNAC) can now be defined.
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Definition 3.2 For a finitely additive measure probability measure π on (Ω,Σ) and a pair of
numbers (δ, α), with δ ≤ 1, a generalized neo-additive capacity v is defined as
v(E|π, δ, α) = δ · µα(E) + (1− δ) · π(E)
for all E ∈ Σ.
A neo-additive capacity is the special case of a GNAC which satisfies the additional constraints
δ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The Choquet expected value of an act f with respect to the GNAC v(E|π, δ, α) is given by:
CEU(f) = (1−δ)Eπ(u◦f)+δ(α ·max{x : x ∈ u◦f(Ω)}+(1−α) ·min{x : x ∈ u◦f(Ω)})
We will prove now that the only CEU preferences satisfying the Axiom CCEC are generalized
neo-additive capacities. Hence, for decision makers with CEU preferences which update their
beliefs according to the Full Bayesian updating rule, the stronger Axiom CCEC implies that
capacities must be GNAC. Indeed, for CEU preferences with Full Bayesian updating, Axiom
CCE almost characterizes neo-additive capacities.
Proposition 3.1 CEU preferences satisfy Axiom CCEC if and only if the capacity v is a GNAC.
The following remark indicates the way in which a small generalization of this result is possible.
Remark 3.1 Two remarks are in order.
(i) It is worth noting that our proof uses only one way of Axiom CCEC, namely f ∼E x ⇒
fEx ∼ x.
(ii) In the statement of Axiom CCEC, we can replace the constant act x by slightly more general
acts:
Alternative Axiom: Suppose argmin
ω∈Ω
f(ω) ∩ argmin
ω∈Ω
g(ω) = ∅ ⊂ A and argmax
ω∈Ω
f(ω) ∩
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argmax
ω∈Ω
g(ω) = ∅ ⊂ A, then for any h ∈ F such that
max
{
min
ω∈Ω
f(ω),min
ω∈Ω
g(ω)
}
≤ min
ω∈Ω
h(ω), max
ω∈Ωc
h(ω) ≤ min
{
max
ω∈Ω
f(ω),max
ω∈Ω
g(ω)
}
.
f ∼A g if and only if fAh ∼ gAh.
This alternative axiom is stronger than CCEC but, for CEU preferences, it is equivalent to
CCEC. Hence, for CEU preferences, Axiom CCEC implies GNAC which in turn implies the
alternative axiom.
Let us check that GNAC satisfy this axiom: let argmin
ω∈Ω
f(ω)∩argmin
ω∈Ω
g(ω) = Em and max
ω∈Ω
f(ω)∩
argmax
ω∈Ω
g(ω) = EM. Let p = (1 − δ)π + αδdEm + (1 − α)δdEM , where dE denotes the
Dirac measure of the set E. As max
{
min
ω∈Ω
f(ω),min
ω∈Ω
g(ω)
}
≤ min
ω∈Ω
h(ω), max
ω∈Ωc
h(ω) ≤
min
{
max
ω∈Ω
f(ω),max
ω∈Ω
g(ω)
}
then
∫
fAhdv =
∫
fAhdp and
∫
gAhdv =
∫
gAhdp. As Em and
EM are included in A, then
∫
fdvA =
∫
fdpA and
∫
gdvA =
∫
gdpA. Therefore CCEC comes
from that the same measure is used at every stage.
4 Convex GNAC
Axiom CCEC is satisfied for Multiple Priors (MP) preferences if all prior probability distribu-
tions are updated according to the Bayesian rule (Pires (2002)). It is well known that CEU and
MP preferences coincide if and only if the capacity of a Choquet expected-utility maximizer
is convex. As Horie (2007) has shown, however, Axiom CCEC is no longer satisfied for CEU
with Full Bayesian updating. In order to see why, we need some new notation.
Let v be a convex capacity and C(v) = {m ∈ ∆(Ω)| m ≥ v} its core. Furthermore, let
PE = {
p
p(E)
| p ∈ C(v)} be the set of Bayesian updates of the probabilities in the core C(v). As
Horie (2007) points out, PE ⊆ C(vE). This follows since p ∈ C(vE) and A ⊂ E imply
p(A)
p(E)
− vE(A) =
p(A)
p(E)
−
v(A)
v(A) + v(Ac ∩E)
=
p(A)(v(A)+v(E\A))−v(A)p(E)
p(E)(v(A) + v(E\A))
=
p(A)v(E\A)−v(A)p(E\A)
p(E)(v(A) + v(E\A))
.
As p ∈ C(v), we have p(A) ≥ v(A) and p(E\A) ≤ v(E\A). Hence, p(A)
p(E)
≤ vE(A) and
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PE ⊆ C(vE). Horie (2007) shows by example that PE  C(vE).
For a convex capacity with PE = C(vE) for all E ∈ Σ, we can apply Pires’ result in order to
see that CCEC holds. Our next proposition shows that C(vE) ⊆ PE if and only if v is a convex
GNAC, when |Ω| > 3.
Proposition 4.1 If |Ω| > 3 , C(vE) = PE if and only if v is a convex GNAC.
We conclude this section with a couple of remarks.
Remark 4.1 The following remarks are in order:
(i)Convex neo-additive capacities are ǫ-contaminations. If the state space Ω is finite, then there
exist convex GNAC which are not ǫ-contaminations. For example, n = 4 and π(E) = |E|
|Ω|
,
then v = 6
5
π − 1
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is convex, but not an ε−contamination. With a non-atomic state space Ω,
however, monotonicity implies that the only GNAC are ǫ-contaminations. With neo- additive
capacities, the only way to be pessimistic consists in overweighting the minimum of an act and to
undervalue all other outcomes. For a GNAC, however, there is the possibility of underweighting
the maximum and overweighting all other outcomes.
(ii)Proposition 4.1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for capacities to guarantee
C(vE) = PE. An alternative condition can be found in Theorem 2 of Jaffray (1992). Theorem
4.1, however, holds for convex capacities whereas Jaffray’s Theorem 2 is true only for belief
functions.
(iii) If |Ω| = 3 holds, then C(vE) = PE is true for every convex capacity.
(iv) Note that it follows from Proposition 3.1 that the only case in which C(vE) = PE holds for
convex capacities is when Axiom CCEC is true.
5 Conclusion
In this note, we show that a decision maker with CEU preferences satisfying Consequentialism,
State Independence, and Conditional Certainty Equivalent Consistency will hold beliefs which
are almost neo-additive. Such preferences can be represented by as a linear combination of
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the expected utility with respect to some additive probability distribution and the maximum
and minimum utility over outcomes. Moreover, if beliefs are represented by a convex capacity
then the core of the Full Bayesian updated capacities equals the set of Bayesian updates of the
probabilities in the core of the prior capacity. These observations clarify some open questions
on Fully Bayesian updating of capacities and multiple priors and provide additional arguments
for considering neo-additive capacities in a dynamic context.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
Step 1: Let f =
n∑
j=1
xjAj where Aj is the indicator function of the set Aj and u(xj) < u(xj+1),
then
∫
fdv =
∫
fdm with m measure such that for all j v(Aj ...An) = m(Aj...An).
Lemma A.1 v satisfies CCEC then for anyAi with i = 1, n we have
∫
fdvAci =
1
m(Aci )
∫
fdmAci ,
where
∫
fdvAci is the Choquet integral of f when Aci has occurred and
∫
fdmAci is integral of
f calculated according to m updated by Bayes rule.
That lemma means that, for those Ai with i = 1, n, i.e.. the ones for which the values are not
the extreme ones, the Choquet integral of f is calculated according to the same measures wether
it is updated or not. Namely we have
∫
fdv =
∫
fdm, let
∫
fdvAci =
∫
fdp, we are going to
prove m
m(Aci )
= p.
Proof. Let y be the certainty equivalent of f conditional on Aci , f ∼Aci y. If u(y) ≤ u(xi−1),
we define g on Aci as g = z on An and g = f else. By choosing u(z) > u(xi) we get g such
that g ∼Aci x with u(xi−1) < u(x) < u(xi+1). By continuity, this is possible. If u(xi+1) ≤ u(y)
we define another g, such that g ∼Aci x with u(xi−1) < u(x) < u(xi+1), by decreasing x1. f
and g are comonotonic because g is different of f only on the lowest value of f becoming lower
or the highest value becoming higher, therefore
∫
gdvAci =
∫
gdp . Now, we make use of CCEC
and get gAcix ∼ x. As u(xi−1) < u(x) < u(xi+1), f and gAcix are comonotonic so their Choquet
integrals are computed according to the same measure, namely
∫
gAcixdv =
∫
gAcixdm . Now
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we get
∫
gAcixdv = u(x).
∫
Aci
gdm+m(Ai)u(x) = u(x) so
u(x) =
1
m(Aci)
∫
Aci
gdm =
∫
Aci
gdvAci =
∫
Aci
gdp.
Let π = m
m(Aci )
− p, we have
∫
Aci
gdπ = 0. Let us prove π = 0. For each Aj, j = i we define gj
as follows: gj = g on Acj and gj = xǫj on Acj . We have gj ∼Aci x
′
j . By continuity of u, we can
select xǫj close to xj and get u(xi−1) < u(x′j) < u(xi+1) {rem here j = i ± 1}. gj and g are
comonotonic therefore g
jAci
x is calculated with the same measure m and also gj updated when
Ai has occurred with the same p. So with the same reasoning as above we get
∫
Aci
gjdπ = 0.
The gj are independent vectors so π = 0. Therefore, we obtain the result announced.
Step 2. We have
∫
fdvAci =
1
m(Aci )
∫
Aci
fdm. That is true for each measure m such that
∫
fdv =∫
fdm whatever the ranking of Ai provided it is not extreme. So for two such measures m
and m′ (let us say that for m, u(xi) is between u(xj) and u(xj+1) and for m′, u(xi) is between
u(xj′) and u(xj′+1)), we have:
1
m(Aci)
∫
Aci
fdm =
1
m′(Aci)
∫
Aci
fdm′
that equality is true for all g such that g =
n∑
j=1,j =i
xjAj and g comonotonic with f. So m(Aci) =
m′(Aci). We have m(Aci) = 1−m(Ai) = 1− v(Ai∪Aj+1...An)+ v(Aj+1...An), and m′(Aci) =
1−m′(Ai) = 1− v(Ai ∪Aj′+1...An) + v(Aj′+1...An)
v(Ai ∪ Aj+1...An)− v(Aj+1...An) = v(Ai ∪Aj′+1...An)− v(Aj′+1...An)
This is true for any f, let Ai = E as Ai i = 1, n, let F = Aj+1...An let G = Aj′+1...An the
first hand of the equality holds if v(Ai ∪ Aj+1...An) − v(Aj+1...An) = 1, i.e. v(F ) = 0 and
v(F ∪E) = 1 (which insures us that vAci exists), the second hand of the equality is available for
every G such that v(G) = 0 and v(G ∪ E) = 1 (which insures us that m(Aci) = 0). So we get:
v(F ∪E)− v(F ) = v(G ∪ E)− v(G)
Step 3. Now we make use of Proposition 3.1 of Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007).
This proposition states four properties which are equivalent to being a neo-additive capacity.
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From the proof of that proposition, it turns out that, without other null sets than the empty set,
a GNAC is a capacity which fulfills condition (a). So we can conclude that the capacity v is a
GNAC.
Proof of Proposition 4.1:
Let us suppose C(vE) = PE. C(vE) is the core of a convex capacity. It is known, see e.g.
Delbaen (1974), that for any maximal chain (a chain is an ordered set of sets) C1 ⊂ ..Ci.. ⊂ E
we have got µ ∈ C(vE) such that ∀i µ(Ci) = vE(Ci). µ ∈ PE so for all i there exists p ∈ C(v)
such that,
p(Ci)
p(E)
= vE(Ci) =
v(Ci)
v(Ci) + v(E\Ci)
Which means from computations made above that p(Ci)v(E\Ci) − v(Ci)p(E\Ci) = 0. As
p(Ci) ≥ v(Ci) and p(E\Ci) ≤ v(E\Ci), we get p(Ci) = v(Ci) and p(E\Ci) = v(E\Ci).
From (1) we deduce that for all i,
p(E) = v(Ci) + v(E\Ci) = 1 + v(Ci)− v(Ci ∪ E
c)
so for A and B non void strictly included in E and ordered by inclusion we have,
v(Ec ∪A)− v(A) = v(Ec ∪ B)− v(B)
We can prove it remains true if A and B are not ordered by inclusion. if A ∩ B = ∅, we have,
v(Ec ∪A)− v(A) = v(Ec ∪ (A ∩B))− v(A ∩B) = v(Ec ∪ B)− v(B)
if A ∪B  E we do the same with A ∪ B :
v(Ec ∪A)− v(A) = v(Ec ∪ (A ∪B))− v(A ∪B) = v(Ec ∪ B)− v(B)
The remaining case is A ∪ B = E and A ∩ B = ∅, if |E| > 2, we pick a non void set included
in A or B, say A´, and get,
v(Ec ∪A)− v(A) = v(Ec ∪ A´)− v(A´) = v(Ec ∪ (A´∪B))− v(A´∪B) = v(Ec ∪B)− v(B)
if |E| = 2, as |Ω| > 3 we can write Ec = F ∪G and get,
(i) : v(F ∪G ∪ A))− v(G ∪ A) = v(F ∪G ∪ B)− v(G ∪ B)
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(ii) : v(G ∪A)− v(A) = v(G ∪ B)− v(B)
(i)− (ii) : v(Ec ∪A))− v(A) = v(Ec ∪B)− v(B)
So we get the property (a) which insures that v is a GNAC.
Conversely, let us suppose that v is a GNAC, we just need to prove that any extreme point
µ of C(vE) belongs to PE. There exits a maximal chain C1 ⊂ ..Ci..Ck ⊂ E such that ∀i,
µ(Ci) = vE(Ci). We are going to construct p ∈ C(v) such that for all i,
p(Ci)
p(E)
= vE(Ci) =
v(Ci)
v(Ci) + v(E\Ci)
On P(E), the set of parts of E, v/E, v restricted to E is a convex capacity, so we can find in its
core a probability p such that p(Ci) = v(Ci) and p(E) = v(Ck)+ v(E\Ck), (compare Delbaen
(1974)). By the Hahn Banach Theorem, we can extend p to Σ with p in the core of v. As v
satisfies property (a) we have
p(E) = v(Ci) + v(E\Ci) = 1 + v(Ci)− v(Ci ∪ E
c).
Hence,
p(Ci ∪E
c) = p(E) + p(Ci) = v(Ci ∪ E
c).
Thus, p satisfies property (a) and we have C(vE) = PE.
Appendix B. Null sets
In this appendix we show that, with the appropriate modifications, one can extend the results
of this paper to the case of general null and universal sets which was treated in Chateauneuf,
Eichberger, and Grant (2007).
For any capacity v, there exists a partition of Ω into the set of null eventsN , the set of universal
events U , the set of essential events E . Those sets have the following properties: ∅ ∈ N ; if
A ∈ N then B ∈ N , for every B ⊂ A; A ∈ N and B ∈ N then A ∪ B ∈ N , U = {E ∈ Σ;
Ec ∈ N}. The definitions of section 2 are modified on the following way:
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Definition B.1 (Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007)).The Hurwicz capacity exactly
congruent with N and α degree of optimism is defined to be
µNα = 0 if E ∈ N ; µNα = 1 if E ∈ Ω\N and µNα = α else.
Definition B.2 For a given set of null events N , a finitely additive measure probability mea-
sure π on (Ω,Σ) that is null onN and a pair of number (δ, α), with δ, α ∈ [0, 1], a neo-additive
capacity v is defined as
v(E/N , π, δ, α) = δ · µNα (E) + (1− δ) · π(E)
for all E ∈ Σ.
Definition B.3 For a given set of null events N , a finitely additive measure probability mea-
sure π on (Ω,Σ) that is null onN and a pair of number (δ, α), with δ ≤ 1, a GNAC v is defined
as
v(E/N , π, δ, α) = δ · µNα (E) + (1− δ) · π(E)
for all E ∈ Σ.
The Choquet expected value of a simple function f with respect to the neo-additive capacity
v(E/N , π, δ, α) is given by:∫
fdv = (1− δ)Eπ(f) + δ(α ·max{x : f
−1(x) /∈ N}+ (1− α) ·min{y : f−1(y) /∈ N})
For general null sets, Proposition 3.1 remains valid.
Proposition B.1 CEU preferences satisfy Axiom CCEC if and only if the capacity v is a GNAC.
Proof. With null sets, a GNAC must fulfill not only condition (a), already mentioned, but also
condition (d) of Proposition 3.1 of Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007).
A capacity v is a generalized neo-additive capacity if and only if
(a) for any three events (E,F,G) ∈ E × E × E such that E ∩F = ∅ = E ∩G, E ∪F /∈ U and
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E ∪G /∈ U ,
v(E ∪ F )− v(F ) = v(E ∪G)− v(G), (B-1)
(d) for any E ∈ E and any F ∈ N such that E ∩ F = ∅, v(E ∪ F ) = v(E).
It remains to prove that (d) is also satisfied. Note first that Equation B-1 is satisfied for all sets
E, F and G such that (F ) = 0, v(F ∪ E) = 1, v(G) = 0 and v(G ∪ E) = 1. Let N be a
null set and E an essential event we want to prove that v(N ∪E) = v(E). By removing all the
null sets of N c, we get a set U such that U ⊂ N c, v(U) = 1, ∀A ⊂ U, v(A) = 0 ⇔ A = ∅.
We can apply Proposition 3.1 on U because there is no other null set than the void set on U
and we get v/U is a GNAC, let us say v/U(E) = v(E/π, δ, α). There exists two essential sets
A2 and A3 such that A2 ∪ A3 = U \ E. Now we consider the algebra A whose atoms are
E ∪N = A1 , A2 and A3, let us call v′ the restriction of v to this algebra. On this algebra there
is no other null set than the void one end do we can apply Proposition 3.1 so for E ∈ A we
have v′(E) = v(E/π′, δ′, α′). Now, we have v′(A2) = π′(A2) + α′δ′, v′(A3) = π′(A3) + α′δ′,
v′(A2 ∪ A3) = π′(A2 ∪ A3) + α′δ
′ so α′δ′ = v′(A2 ∪ A3) − v′(A2) − v′(A3). As the sets
A2 and A3 belong to U, we have αδ = v(A2 ∪ A3) − v(A2) − v(A3) and, as for E ∈ A,
v′(E) = v(E), we have α′δ′ = αδ and π(A2) = π′(A2) and π(A3) = π′(A3). As v(U) = 1 and
v(A1 ∪A2 ∪A3) = 1 we have π(E) = 1− π(A2)− π(A3) and π′(A1) = 1− π′(A2)− π′(A3),
therefore we have v(E) = v(E ∪N).
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